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1. Introduction
We address the biometric authentication setup where the outcomes of biometric observations
received at the verification stage are compared with the sample data formed at the enrollment
stage. The result of comparison is either the acceptance or the rejection of the identity claim.
The acceptance decision corresponds to the case when the analyzed values belong to the same
person.
A possible solution to the problem, called the direct authentication, is implemented when the
outcomes of biometric observations at the enrollment stage are stored in the database, and
they are available to the verifier. The possible incorrect verifier’s decisions are caused by the
fact that these observations are noisy. The probabilities of errors are called the false rejection
and the false acceptance rates. The features of the direct authentication are as follows: 1)
data compression is not included at the enrollment stage; 2) the scheme does not require an
additional external randomness; 3) if the stored data become available to an attacker, then
he knows the outcomes of biometric observations of the person and can pass through the
verification stage with the acceptance decision by presenting these data to the verifier. The
considered below coding approaches to the problem require an external randomness and relax
the constraint that the database has to be protected against reading. These approaches include
the additive and the permutation coding schemes.
Both the direct authentication and an additive coding scheme are illustrated using a proposed
mathematical model for the DNA measurements. We present the model and describe a data
compression method that can be used to approach a uniform probability distribution over the
obtained data for their further use in the additive scheme and other purposes. The processing
of the DNA data also serves as an example of possible processing data generated by an
arbitrary memoryless source.
The additive block coding scheme can be viewed as a variant of stream ciphering scheme
where the data, to be hidden, are added to a key. The subtraction of the noisy version of
the data creates a corrupted version of the key. If the key is a codeword of a code having
certain error–correcting property, then the fact, whether the key can be reconstructed or not,
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characterizes the level of the noise. In the permutation scheme, the enciphering of the input
data is organized by choosing a permutation, which maps the biometric vector to a key
vector. There are many permutations that can be used for this purpose, and it gives additional
possibilities to the designer of the verification scheme.
The efficiency of cryptographic schemes, like the additive and the permutation schemes, is
measured by the difference between the probabilities of the successful attack by an attacker,
who either knows the content of the database or ignorant about these data. The additive
scheme is efficient when the probability distribution over the input vectors is close to a
uniform distribution. This requirement is less critical for the permutation scheme, but input
vectors have to be represented by binary vectors having a fixed number of ones. We will
present a simple numerical example of the implementation of the permutation scheme and
describe an algorithm for the transformation of an arbitrary binary vector to a balanced vector
having the same number of zeroes and ones.
There is a number of open problems in the implementation of coding schemes. One of the
main problems is the representation of real biometric data in digital format, which allows one
to use the memoryless assumption about the data and the Hamming distance as the measure
of closeness of two observations. Another class of problems is constructing the specific codes
and the decoding algorithms having a low computational complexity. We also believe that
there is a request for a general theory of processing noisy data, since the known solutions in
biometrics are mostly oriented to specific measurements (fingerprints, iris, palmprints, etc.)
and a particular application.
The authentication problem belongs to the list of basic problems that have to be solved in
the biometric direction, and it is included in the most of the books on biometrics (see Bolle
et. al (2004), for example). The additive block coding scheme was suggested in Juels &
Wattenberg (1999). The close relationships between the additive scheme and the wiretap
channel, introduced in Wyner (1975), where the verifier receives the signals from the outputs
of two parallel channels in the legitimate case and the signals from only one of channels in
the case of the presence of an attacker. It implies the relevance of information and coding
theory results (see Cohen & Zemor (2006), for example) to the investigation of the scheme.
The permutation scheme was proposed in Dodis, et. al (2004) under the uniform probability
distribution over the permutations. The algorithm for the mapping of an arbitrary binary
vector to a balanced vector, which can be used in the permutation scheme, was described in
Knuth (1986). The available DNAmeasurement data were received in the BioKey–STR project
(Korte et. al (2008)).
The text of the chapter is a compressed version of the results in Balakirsky, Ghazaryan & Han
Vinck (2006–2011). The general principles of constructing biometric authentication, which also
include the points of rate–distortion coding, were presented in (2006a), (2006b). The described
mathematical model for the DNA data was introduced in (2008a), and the data processing
scheme was studied in (2009b) as an extension of the transformations for continuous random
variables described in (2007). The similar analysis is relevant to the constructing passwords
from biometric data, as it is indicated in (2010). The general expressions for the additive
and the permutation block coding schemes for an arbitrary probability distribution over the
biometric vectors are given in (2008a), (2009a). The standard technique of probability and
coding theory, which is used in the chapter, can be found in Gallager (1968).
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2. Notation and basic assumptions
Let B = B1 × · · · × Bn, where Bt = {0, . . . ,Kt − 1} is a finite set containing Kt elements. We
say that b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B is a biometric vector and assume that the probability distribution
ω =
(
ω(b) = Pr
bio
{ B = b }, b ∈ B
)
is known. Moreover, let ω be a memoryless probability distribution, i.e.,
ω(b) =
n
∏
t=1
ωt(bt) (1)
for all b ∈ B. We also write
ωt(b) = Pr
bio
{ Bt = b }
for all b ∈ Bt. Denote the most likely biometric vector by b
∗ = (b∗1 , . . . , b
∗
n),
b∗ = argmax
b∈B
ω(b).
Then, by (1),
b∗t = argmax
b∈Bt
ωt(b), t = 1, . . . , n,
and
ω(b∗) =
n
∏
t=1
ω∗t
where
ω∗t = max
b∈Bt
ωt(b). (2)
Furthermore, let
ωt = ∑
b∈Bt
ω2t (b) (3)
and
H(ωt) = −
qt−1
∑
b=0
ωt(b) logωt(b). (4)
Then ωt is the probability that two independent runs of the t-th biometric source result in
two equal symbols, and H(ωt) is the entropy of the probability distribution ωt, which can be
understood as the number of random bits at the output of the t-th biometric source.
We will use the component–wise transformation of the vector b to another vector z and
organize it in such a way that the probability distribution over the vectors z is close to a
uniform distribution. Introduce the following notation. Let us fix qt ≤ Kt as an integer power
of 2 and let Zt = {0, . . . , qt − 1}. Let us map b ∈ Bt to z ∈ Zt if and only if b ∈ Bt,z, where
Bt,0, . . . ,Bt,qt−1 are pairwise disjoint sets whose union coincides with Bt. One can see that such
a specification uniquely determines z and we denote it by z(b|qt). Let
zb = (z(b1|q1), . . . , z(bn|qn)) (5)
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denote the result of the mapping B → Z = Z1 × · · · × Zn, which is parameterized by the
vector q = (q1, . . . , qn) and the partitionings of the sets B1, . . . ,Bn. We also denote
Ωt(z) = ∑
b∈Bt,z
ωt(b)
for all z ∈ Zt and
Ω(z) =
n
∏
t=1
Ωt(zt)
for all z ∈ Z . Furthermore, let
ρt =
maxz∈Zt Ω(z)
minz∈Zt Ω(z)
. (6)
Let the noisy observations of the biometric vector b be specified by the conditional probability
distributions (
V(b′|b) = Pr
err
{ B′ = b′ | B = b }, b′ ∈ B
)
, b ∈ B,
and let
V(b′|b) =
n
∏
t=1
Vt(b
′
t|bt) (7)
for all b,b′ ∈ B. We also write
Vt(b
′|b) = Pr
err
{ B′t = b
′ | Bt = b }
for all b, b′ ∈ Bt and pay special attention to the conditional probability distributions such that
Vt(b|b) = 1− ε, for all b ∈ Bt, (8)
where ε > 0 is a given constant.
The transformation B → Z preserves the V channel in a sense that (8) implies
Vt(zb|b) = ∑
b′∈Bt,zb
Vt(b
′|b) ≥ Vt(b|b) = 1− ε
for all b ∈ Bt. Therefore, the Vt channel Bt → Bt is transformed to another Vt,qt channel
Zt → Zt such that
Vt,qt (z|z) ≥ 1− ε, for all z ∈ Zt. (9)
Let
Ham(b,b′) =
∣∣∣{t ∈ {1, . . . , n} : bt = b′t
}∣∣∣
denote the Hamming distance between the vectors b,b′ ∈ B and let
DT(b) =
{
b′ ∈ B : Ham(b,b′) ≤ T
}
(10)
denote the set of biometric vectors located at distance T or less from the vector b. The
conditional probability of generating a vector belonging to the set DT(b), given the vector
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b, is defined as
V(DT(b)|b) = ∑
b′∈DT(b)
V(b′|b). (11)
Notice that if conditions (8) are satisfied, then
V(DT(b)|b) =
T
∑
d=0
(
n
d
)
(1− ε)n−dεd (12)
for all b ∈ B.
3. Mathematical model for the DNA measurements
The most common DNA variations are Short Tandem Repeats (STR): arrays of 5 to 50 copies
(repeats) of the same pattern (the motif) of 2 to 6 pairs. As the number of repeats of the motif
highly varies among individuals, it can be effectively used for identification of individuals.
The human genome contains several 100,000 STR loci, i.e., physical positions in the DNA
sequence where an STR is present. An individual variant of an STR is called allele. Alleles
are denoted by the number of repeats of the motif. The genotype of a locus comprises both
the maternal and the paternal allele. However, without additional information, one cannot
determine which allele resides on the paternal or the maternal chromosome. If the measured
numbers are equal to each other, then the genotype is called homozygous. Otherwise,
it is called heterozygous. The STR measurement errors are usually classified into three
groups: (1) allelic drop–in, when in a homozygous genotype, an additional allele is erroneously
included, e.g. genotype (10,10) is measured as (10,12); (2) allelic drop–out, when an allele of a
heterozygous genotype is missing, e.g. genotype (7,9) is measured as (7,7); (3) allelic shift,
when an allele is measured with a wrong repeat number, e.g. genotype (10,12) is measured as
(10,13).
The points above can be formalized as follows. Suppose that there are n sources. For all
t = 1, . . . , n, there is a probability distribution
pit =
(
pit(i), i ∈ {ct, . . . , ct + kt − 1}
)
,
where ct, kt are given positive integers. Let the probability that the t-th source generates the
pair (i, j), where i, j ∈ {ct, . . . , ct + kt − 1}, be defined as
Pr
DNA
{
(At,1, At,2) = (i, j)
}
= pit(i)pit(j).
Thus, we assume that At,1 and At,2 are independent random variables that contain
information about the number of repeats of the t-th motif in the maternal and the paternal
allele. We also assume that (A1,1, A1,2), . . . , (An,1, An,2) are independent pairs of random
variables, i.e.,
Pr
DNA
{
(A1, A2) = (i, j)
}
=
n
∏
t=1
Pr
DNA
{
(At,1, At,2) = (it, jt)
}
,
where A1 = (A1,1, . . . , An,1), A2 = (A1,2, . . . , An,2) and i = (i1, . . . , in), j = (j1, . . . , jn).
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Let
St =
(
min{At,1, At,2},max{At,1, At,2}
)
.
Then
Pr
DNA
{
St = (i, j)
}
= p˜it(i, j),
where
p˜it(i, j) =
⎧⎨
⎩
pi2t (i), if j = i,
2pit(i)pit(j), if j > i,
0, if j < i.
Denote Bt = {0, . . . ,Kt − 1}, where Kt = kt(kt + 1)/2, order Kt probabilities belonging to the
distribution
p˜it =
(
p˜it(i, j), i, j ∈ {ct, . . . , ct + kt − 1}, j ≥ i
)
in the decreasing order, assign them indices b = 0, . . . ,Kt − 1, and replace p˜it with the
probability distribution
ωt =
(
ωt(b), b ∈ {0, . . . ,Kt − 1}
)
,
i.e., the probability distributions p˜it and ωt contain the same entries in different order.
The transformations below are illustrated for the TH01 allele (see Tables 2, 3), where t = 12,
ct = 6, kt = 4, and
(pit(6), . . . ,pit(9)) = (.234, .192, .085, .487).
Then
[
pit(i)pit(j)
]
i,j=6,...,9
=
j = 6 j = 7 j = 8 j = 9
i = 6 .0550 .0452 .0200 .1143
i = 7 .0452 .0371 .0165 .0939
i = 8 .0200 .0165 .0073 .0416
i = 9 .1143 .0939 .0416 .2376
To compute the entries of the probability distribution p˜it, we transform this matrix to the right
triangular matrix below. The entries above the diagonal are doubled, and the entries below
the diagonal are replaced with the zeroes.
[
p˜it(i, j)
]
i,j=6,...,9
j≥i
=
j = 6 j = 7 j = 8 j = 9
i = 6 .0550 .0903 .0401 .2286
i = 7 .0371 .0329 .1878
i = 8 .0073 .0833
i = 9 .2376
The ordering of the non-zero entries of this matrix brings the probability distribution ωt. Its
entries and parameters ω∗t , ωt, defined in (2), (3), are given below.
i, j 9, 9 6, 9 7, 9 6, 7 8, 9 6, 6 6, 8 7, 7 7, 8 8, 8
p˜it(i, j) .2376 .2286 .1878 .0903 .0833 .0550 .0401 .0371 .0329 .0073
b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ωt(b) .2376 .2286 .1878 .0903 .0833 .0550 .0401 .0371 .0329 .0073
ω∗t .2376
ωt .2376 .2376 + . . . + .0073 .0073 = .0609
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b 0 9 1 8 2 5 3 4 6 7
ωt(b) .2376 .0073 .2286 .0329 .1878 .0550 .0903 .0833 .0401 .0371
z 0 1 2 3
Ωt(z) .2449 .2615 .2428 .2508
ρt(z) .2615/.2428 = 1.08
Table 1. Example of the mapping {0, . . . , 9} → {0, . . . , 3}.
Let qt be the maximum integer power of 2 such that
1/qt ≥ ω
∗
t ,
where ω∗t is defined in (2). Then one can partition the set Bt in qt subsets in such a way the
resulting probability distribution over these subsets is close to a uniform distribution. An
example of the partitioning is given in Table 1. Notice that the entropy of the distribution ωt
is equal to 2.851 (see Table 3), while the entropy of the distribution Ωt is less and it is close to
log qt.
The available experimental data consist of probability distributions pi1, . . . ,pi28, and they are
given in Table 2. The computed parameters are shown in Table 3. We conclude that results
of the DNA measurements can be represented by a binary vector of length 140 bits. However
the probability distribution over these vectors is non–uniform and, roughly speaking, only
109 bits carry information about the measurements. The most likely vector of pairs has
the probability 0.124 . . . 0.243 = 10−23, and the probability that the sources independently
generate two equal vectors is equal to 0.013 . . . 0.046 = 10−50. The greedy algorithm for
partitioning the sets B1, . . . ,Bn in q1, . . . , qn brings the vectors that can be expressed by
log q1 + · · · + log qn = 68 bits with the property that ρ1 . . . ρn ≈ 16, where ρ1, . . . , ρn are
defined in (6). Therefore, the most likely vector of length 68 bits has the probability 2−64.
Notice that the spectrum of components of the vector q can be presented the as the sequence
(q × Nq), q = 21, . . . , 26, where Nq is the number of indices t with qt = q. Namely, the
constructed vector q has the spectrum
(2× 7), (4× 8), (8× 9), (16× 3), (32× 0), (64× 1) (13)
and
28 = 7+ 8+ 9+ 3+ 0+ 1,
68 = 7 · log 2+ 8 · log 4+ 9 · log 8+ 3 · log 16+ 0 · log 32+ 1 · log 64.
4. Direct authentication schemes
Let us consider the following setup. Suppose that b,b′ ∈ B are given vectors of length n. If
the Hamming distance between these vectors is not greater than a fixed threshold T, then the
verifier has to make the acceptance decision. Otherwise, the verifier has to make the rejection
decision. Hence, the rules are as follows:
RAcc: if b
′ ∈ DT(b), then accept the identity claim (Acc);
RRej: if b
′ ∈ DT(b), then reject the identity claim (Rej).
305Block Coding Schemes Designed for Biometric Authentication
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t Name pit
1 D8S1179 .319 .194 .173 .119 .105 .086
2 D3S1358 .265 .257 .218 .154 .104
3 VWA .283 .202 .202 .111 .105 .095
4 D7S820 .248 .211 .180 .168 .155 .035
5 ACTBP2 .089 .080 .073 .072 .070 .064 .062 .053 .051 .049
.047 .046 .043 .039 .037 .034 .033 .028 .012 .009
6 D7S820 .243 .207 .177 .165 .152 .034 .018
7 FGA .223 .192 .139 .139 .129 .072 .053 .026 .023
8 D21S11 .308 .200 .183 .160 .091 .028 .026
9 D18S51 .162 .142 .142 .135 .130 .129 .078 .039 .022 .016
10 D19S433 .382 .259 .173 .086 .082 .015
11 D13S317 .339 .248 .124 .112 .074 .051 .048
12 TH01 .487 .234 .192 .085
13 D2S138 .182 .146 .122 .117 .114 .093 .079 .041 .038 .033
.029
14 D16S539 .326 .321 .145 .112 .056 .019 .018
15 D5S818 .389 .365 .142 .052 .050
16 TPOX .537 .244 .119 .056 .041
17 CF1PO .365 .305 .219 .097 .011
18 D8S1179 .304 .185 .165 .114 .100 .082 .031 .011 .003
19 VWA1 .283 .202 .202 .111 .105 .095
20 PentaD .265 .214 .189 .156 .089 .060 .014 .010
21 PentaE .180 .170 .110 .105 .102 .080 .056 .051 .051 .034
.029 .010 .010 .007
22 DYS390 .422 .282 .164 .103 .014 .011
23 DYS429 .445 .325 .118 .096 .013
24 DYS437 .528 .317 .154
25 DYS391 .513 .451 .018 .016
26 DYS385 .551 .124 .097 .087 .059 .037 .030 .012
27 DYS389I .663 .186 .150
28 DYS389II .446 .272 .167 .081 .032
Table 2. The entries of the probability distributions pi1, . . . ,pi28, which are greater than 0.001,
given in the decreasing order.
“The identity claim” in the description above appears because we assume that the vectors b
and b′ contain outcomes of measurements of some biometric parameters of two people. The
verification is understood as a procedure, which checks whether the difference between the
results is caused by the observation noise or by the fact that people are different.
The direct implementation of the authentication procedure includes the enrollment and the
verification stages (see Figure 1).
The enrollment stage.
– Store the biometric vector b in the database.
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t Name logKt ⌈logKt⌉ ω
∗
t log qt H(ωt) ωt
1 D8S1179 4.392 5 0.124 3 4.083 0.013
2 D3S1358 3.907 4 0.137 2 3.714 0.012
3 VWA 4.392 5 0.115 3 4.127 0.010
4 D7S820 4.392 5 0.105 3 4.074 0.008
5 ACTBP2 7.714 8 0.014 6 7.426 0.000
6 D7S820 4.807 5 0.101 3 4.241 0.008
7 FGA 5.492 6 0.086 3 4.916 0.005
8 D21S11 4.807 5 0.124 3 4.130 0.013
9 D18S51 5.781 6 0.046 4 5.279 0.002
10 D19S433 4.392 5 0.199 2 3.593 0.027
11 D13S317 4.807 5 0.169 2 4.151 0.018
12 TH01 3.322 4 0.238 2 2.851 0.061
13 D2S138 6.044 7 0.053 4 5.601 0.002
14 D16S539 4.807 5 0.210 2 3.776 0.023
15 D5S818 3.907 4 0.285 1 3.111 0.041
16 TPOX 3.907 4 0.289 1 2.909 0.087
17 CF1PO 3.907 4 0.223 2 3.157 0.029
18 D8S1179 5.492 6 0.113 3 4.487 0.011
19 VWA1 4.392 5 0.115 3 4.127 0.010
20 PentaD 5.170 6 0.114 3 4.325 0.009
21 PentaE 6.907 7 0.062 4 5.870 0.002
22 DYS390 4.392 5 0.239 2 3.238 0.039
23 DYS429 3.907 4 0.290 1 2.972 0.051
24 DYS437 2.585 3 0.335 1 2.259 0.089
25 DYS391 3.322 4 0.464 1 1.902 0.111
26 DYS385 5.170 6 0.304 1 3.607 0.093
27 DYS389I 2.585 3 0.440 1 2.008 0.195
28 DYS389II 3.907 4 0.243 2 3.145 0.046
128.6 140 10−23 68 109.1 10−50
Table 3. Some characteristics of the probability distributions ω1, . . . ,ω28 that describe the
DNA measurements.
The verification stage.
– Read the biometric vector b associated with the claimed person from the database. If b′ ∈ DT(b),
then make the acceptance decision (Acc). If b′ ∈ DT(b), then make the rejection decision (Rej).
The basic parameters of the scheme are the false rejection rate FRR, the false acceptance rate
FAR, and the average false acceptance rate FAR, introduced as
FRR = ∑
b,b′∈B
ω(b)V(b′|b)χ{b′ ∈ DT(b)}, (14)
FAR = max
b′∈B
∑
b∈B
ω(b)χ{b′ ∈ DT(b)}, (15)
FAR = ∑
b,b′∈B
ω(b)ω(b′)χ{b′ ∈ DT(b)}, (16)
307Block Coding Schemes Designed for Biometric Authentication
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✲Bio DB
b
The enrollment stage
✻
✲ ✲ Acc/Rej
b′
b
DB b′ ∈ DT(b)?
The verification stage
Fig. 1. The data processing in a direct authentication scheme.
where χ denotes the indicator function: χ{S} = 1 is the statement S is true and χ{S} = 0
otherwise. The false rejection rate is the probability of the event that the verifier makes the
rejection decision when the observations belong to the same person. The false acceptance
rate is the probability of the event that the verifier makes the acceptance decision when the
vector b′ is generated by an attacker. The average false acceptance rate is the probability of the
event that the verifier makes the acceptance decision when the vector b′ contains outcomes of
biometric observations of a randomly chosen person.
If the V channel satisfies (8), then the false rejection rate is expressed using (12),
FRR =
n
∑
d=T+1
(
n
d
)
(1− ε)n−dεd. (17)
To compute the false acceptance rates, we use the generating functions technique.
Let us consider the problem of computing FAR and introduce the generating function
Gt(z) = ωt + (1−ωt)z,
308 Advanced Biometric Technologies
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where z is a formal variable and ωt is defined in (3) as the probability that two independent
runs of the t-th source result in two equal symbols. Furthermore, denote
G(z) =
n
∏
t=1
Gt(z)
and represent the polynomial G(z) as
G(z) =
n
∑
d=0
Coefd
[
G(z)
]
zd.
Then the d-th term of the sum at the right-hand side is equal to the probability that two
independent runs of n sources result in vectors that differ in d components. Hence,
FAR =
T
∑
d=0
Coefd
[
G(z)
]
.
Similar manipulations bring the formula
∑
b∈B
ω(b)χ{b′ ∈ DT(b)} =
T
∑
d=0
Coefd
[
G(z|b′)
]
, (18)
where
G(z|b′) =
n
∏
t=1
(
ωt(b
′
t) + (1−ωt(b
′
t))z
)
.
One can easily see that the sum at the right-hand side of (18) is maximized when b′ = b∗ and
FAR =
T
∑
d=0
Coefd
[
G(z|b∗)
]
,
where
G(z|b∗) =
n
∏
t=1
(
ω∗t + (1−ω
∗
t )z
)
and ω∗1 , . . . ,ω
∗
n are defined in (2).
Some numerical results for the DNA data are given in Table 4. We conclude that the
probability of successful attack in the case when the attacker does not know the content of
the database can be very small. However, the main problem with the direct authentication
scheme is caused by the point that the biometric vector itself is stored in the database. If an
attacker would have an access to the database, then he does not have any difficulties with the
passing through the verification stage with the acceptance decision. Moreover, the biometrics,
being compromized, is compromized forever and it can be also used for any other purposes.
A possible solution to the hiding problem is the use of the cryptographic “one–way” hash
function Hash : it is assumed that the value of the function can be easily computed for a given
argument, but the value of the argument is hard to get for a given value of the function. If only
Hash(b) is known to the verifier, then he can compute the values of Hash(b˜) for all vectors
b˜ located at the Hamming distance at most T from the vector b′ and make the acceptance
309Block Coding Schemes Designed for Biometric Authentication
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FRR
T ε = 0.05 ε = 0.01 FAR FAR ˆFAR
0 7.6 · 10−1 2.5 · 10−1 7.7 · 10−24 2.5 · 10−50 3.4 · 10−21
1 4.1 · 10−1 3.2 · 10−2 1.9 · 10−21 1.7 · 10−46 6.9 · 10−19
2 1.6 · 10−1 2.7 · 10−3 2.0 · 10−19 3.4 · 10−43 6.1 · 10−17
3 4.9 · 10−2 1.7 · 10−4 1.3 · 10−17 3.7 · 10−40 3.2 · 10−15
4 1.2 · 10−2 8.1 · 10−6 5.8 · 10−16 2.5 · 10−37 1.2 · 10−13
5 2.3 · 10−3 3.1 · 10−7 1.9 · 10−14 1.2 · 10−34 3.1 · 10−12
6 3.6 · 10−4 9.8 · 10−9 4.8 · 10−13 4.2 · 10−32 6.4 · 10−11
7 4.9 · 10−5 2.6 · 10−10 9.7 · 10−12 1.1 · 10−29 1.0 · 10−9
8 5.6 · 10−6 5.8 · 10−12 1.6 · 10−10 2.3 · 10−27 1.3 · 10−8
9 5.6 · 10−7 1.1 · 10−13 2.1 · 10−9 3.7 · 10−25 1.4 · 10−7
Table 4. The false rejection and the false acceptance rates for the DNA measurements.
b ∈ B
y
xˆ ∈ C
xˆ = x?
b′
✲ ✲ ✲
✲
✻
x ∈ C
❄
C
❄
Encoder Verifier
Channel
Fig. 2. General authentication scheme.
decision if one of them is equal to Hash(b). Such a scheme is secure up to the security of
hashing, but requires the hash function to be defined over the set of |B| vectors and very large
computational complexity. The block coding schemes can be viewed as solutions introduced
to relax these requirements.
5. Block coding approach to the authentication problem
The coding problem for biometric verification can be presented as designing codes for the
scheme in Figure 2. Let C ⊂ B be a subset whose entries are codewords assigned by the
designer. The encoding is the transformation of a pair (x,b) ∈ C × B, where the vector b is
generated by the source and x is chosen according to a uniform probability distribution over
the code C, to another vector y = (y1, . . . , yn) belonging to some finite set Y . The mappings
(x,b) → y, (y,b′) → x
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xˆ = x?
b′
✲ ✲ ✲
✲
✻
x ∈ C
❄
C
❄
Encoder Verifier
Attacker
Fig. 3. General authentication scheme from the attacker’s prospective.
are called the encoding and the decoding, respectively. The general requirement to the these
mappings can be presented as
(x,b) → y ⇒
{
b′ ∈ DT(b) ⇒ (y,b
′) → x,
b′ ∈ DT(b) ⇒ (y,b
′) → x.
(19)
In other words, the results of the decoding for the vectors b and b′ have to coincide if and
only if b′ ∈ DT(b).
Both the vector y and the value of Hash(x) are stored in the database under the name of the
person whose biometric characteristics are expressed by the vector b. Having received the
vector b′ and the name of the person, the decoder reads (y, Hash(x)) from the database and
uses the error–correcting capabilities of the code to decode “the transmitted codeword” x as
xˆ. If Hash(xˆ) = Hash(x), then the identity claim is accepted. Otherwise, the claim is rejected.
From the attacker’s prospective, the authentication scheme can be viewed as the scheme in
Figure 3. The attacker reads the content of the database associated with a person, presents the
name of the person, and generates the vector b′. The goal of the attacker is generating of a
vector leading to the verifier’s acceptance decision. The coding problem can be formulated
as constructing codes that simultaneously satisfy the constraint (19) and guarantee a low
probability of the attacker’s success.
6. Additive block coding schemes
Given a positive integer q, let ⊕q and ⊖q denote the addition and the subtraction modulo q,
respectively,
z⊕q z
′ =
{
z + z′, if z + z′ ≤ q,
z + z′ − q, if z + z′ > q
z⊖q z
′ =
{
z− z′, if z + z′ ≥ 0,
z− z′ + q, if z + z′ < 0.
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x ∈ C
zb
x⊕q b
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xˆ ∈ C
xˆ = x?
zb ⊖q zb′
✲ ✲
❄
❄
✲
❄
✲
✻
C
❄
Verifier
Attacker
Fig. 4. Wiretap-type additive block coding scheme.
The operations ⊕q and ⊖q, where q = (q1, . . . , qn), being applied to the vectors of length n,
are understood as component–wise addition and subtraction modulo q1, . . . , qn, i.e.,
z⊕q z
′ = (z1 ⊕q1 z
′
1, . . . , zn ⊕qn z
′
n),
z⊖q z
′ = (z1 ⊖q1 z
′
1, . . . , zn ⊖qn z
′
n).
Let us consider the biometric vector b as an additive noise that corrupts the transmitted
codeword x and the received vector is defined as
y = x⊕q zb,
where zb is the result of the transformation of the biometric vector b defined in (5). The
decoding is based on the observation:
y = x⊕q zb
Ham(zb, zb′ ) ≤ T
}
⇒ Ham(y, x⊕q zb′ ) ≤ T.
Notice also that
y = x⊕q zb ⇒ Ham(y, x⊕q zb′ ) = Ham(y⊖q zb′ , x) = Ham(x⊕q (zb ⊖q zb′ ), x).
Thus, the verifier analyzes the outcomes of transmission of the codeword x over two parallel
channels,
x → x⊕q (zb ⊖q zb′ ) (the observation channel),
x → x⊕q zb (the biometric channel),
while the attacker analyzes only the output of the biometric channel (see Figure 4).
312 Advanced Biometric Technologies
www.intechopen.com
Block Coding Schemes Designed
for Biometric Authentication 15
✲ ✲
✻
✻
✲
✲ ✲
x ∈ C,q
y = x⊕q zb
q
zb
b
Hash(x)
Bio
Tranf
DB
Hash
The enrollment stage
✲ ✲ ✲ ✲
❄ ❄
✻
✻
✲
C,q
y xˆ Hash(xˆ)
Acc/Rej
zb′
b′
q
Hash(x)
DB
Dec Hash =?
Tranf
The verification stage
Fig. 5. The data processing in an additive block coding scheme.
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Processing of a given biometric vector b at the enrollment stage and processing of data at the
verification stage when the verifier considers only the output of the observation channel is
illustrated in Figure 5.
The enrollment stage.
– Choose a key codeword x according to a uniform probability distribution over the code C and
compute the value of Hash(x).
– Store (Hash(x), x⊕q zb) in the database.
The verification stage.
– Read the data (Hash(x), y) associated with the claimed person from the database.
– Decode the key codeword, given a received vector z = y ⊖q zb′ , as xˆ. If Hash(xˆ) = Hash(x),
then make the acceptance decision (Acc). If Hash(xˆ) = Hash(x), then make the rejection decision
(Rej).
Let us illustrate the additive block coding and the decoding algorithms that will be described
in a general form by the numerical example. Let q1 = · · · = q6 = 2, n = 6, and let C be a
binary code consisting of 8 codewords,
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
000000 001011 010101 011110 100110 101101 110011 111000
For example,
zb = 011011
x = 011110
}
→ y = 000101,
and the vector y is stored in the database. Having received another vector zb′ , the verifier tries
to find a codeword xˆ located at distance at most 1 from the vector y⊖q zb′ . For example,
zb′ = 111011
y = 000101
}
→ y⊖q zb′ = 111110 → xˆ = 011110,
and the verifier makes the acceptance decision, since xˆ = x implies Hash(xˆ) = Hash(x). An
attacker wants to submit some vector b′, which also leads to the acceptance. He constructs
the list of candidate vectors as y⊖q x, x ∈ C, and finds the vector xˆ such that Ω(y⊖q x) is the
maximum. For example,
y⊖q x1 y⊖q x2 y⊖q x3 y⊖q x4 y⊖q x5 y⊖q x6 y⊖q x7 y⊖q x8
000101 001110 010000 011011 100011 101000 110110 111101
In particular, if the probabilities Ω(z) decrease when the weight of the vector z increases, then
this algorithm brings the vector xˆ = x3, and the attacker’s vector b
′ is such that zb′ = zy⊖qx3 .
Suppose that C is a block code consisting of M codewords x1, . . . , xM ∈ Z1 × · · · × Zn and
having the minimum distance greater than 2T, i.e.,
x, x′ ∈ C
x = x′
}
⇒ Ham(x, x′) ≥ 2T + 1. (20)
Then the Hamming balls of radius T centered at codewords, DT(x), x ∈ C, are pairwise
disjoint sets. As a result, for any y, zb′ ∈ Z , there is at most one codeword x ∈ C such
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that
Ham(y, x⊕q zb′ ) ≤ T. (21)
Let us denote this codeword by xˆ(y, zb′ ). If the inequality (21) does not hold for all codewords,
we assume that xˆ(y, zb′ ) is a fixed vector (for example, the all–zero vector). Thus,
Ham(zb, zb′ ) ≤ T ⇒ Ham(x⊕q zb, x⊕q zb′ ) ≤ T ⇒ xˆ(x⊕q zb, zb′ ) = x.
Hence, if x is the codeword, which was used to encode the vector zb, and the vector zb′ differs
from the vector zb in at most T components, then the codeword is decoded. Therefore the
false rejection rate is expressed by (14),
FRR = ∑
b,b′∈B
ω(b)V(b′|b)χ{zb′ ∈ DT(zb)}.
The similar conclusion is valid for the false acceptance rate of a randomly chosen person,
FAR = ∑
b,b′
ω(b)ω(b′)χ{Ham(zb, zb′ ) ≤ T}.
Let us analyze the situation when an attacker is present. He receives only the result of
transmission of the codeword over the biometric channel and his action can be presented
as the mapping
(zb1 = y⊖q x1, . . . , zbM = y⊖q xM) → b
′ = bmˆ,
where mˆ ∈ {1, . . . , M} is chosen in such a way that
Ω(zbmˆ ) = max
1≤m≤M
Ω(zbm ). (22)
The submission of the vector bmˆ to the verifier implies xˆ = xmˆ, and the acceptance decision
is made if and only if xmˆ is the codeword that was used to encode the biometric vector at the
enrollment stage. The probability of the attacker’s success, given the vectors zb1 , . . . , zbM , is
equal to
Ω(zbmˆ )
∑
M
m=1 Ω(zbm )
≤
max1≤m≤M Ω(zbm )
Mmin1≤m≤M Ω(zbm )
≤
maxz∈Z Ω(z)
Mminz∈Z Ω(z)
=
1
M
n
∏
t=1
ρt, (23)
where ρ1, . . . , ρn are defined in (6). Since the upper bound (23) holds for any received vector
y, which determines the vectors zb1 , . . . , zbM ,
FAR ≤
1
M
n
∏
t=1
ρt. (24)
Let us evaluate the bound (24) using the standard covering arguments of coding theory. Given
the vector q, introduce the generating function
G(z) =
n
∏
t=1
Gt(z),
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where
Gt(z) =
1
qt
+
qt − 1
qt
z.
For example, for the DNA data (see (13)),
GDNA(z) =
(1
2
+
1
2
z
)7(1
4
+
3
4
z
)8(1
8
+
7
8
z
)9( 1
16
+
1
15
z
)3( 1
64
+
63
64
z
)1
.
One can easily see that the d-th coefficient of the polynomial G(z) is equal to the ratio of the
number of vectors x′ ∈ Z located at the Hamming distance d from any fixed vector x ∈ Z and
q1 . . . qn, i.e.,
1
∏
n
t=1 qt
∣∣∣{x′ ∈ Z : Ham(x, x′) = d}
∣∣∣ = Coefd[ G(z) ].
Therefore,
1
∏
n
t=1 qt
|DT(x)| =
T
∑
d=0
Coefd[ G(z) ]. (25)
Since DT(x1), . . . ,DT(xM) are pairwise disjoint sets,
M
∑
m=1
|DT(xm)| ≤
n
∏
t=1
qt,
and (25) implies
1
M
≥
T
∑
d=0
Coefd[ G(z) ]. (26)
By assuming that there is a code such that (26) holds with the equality and by replacing the
parameters ρ1, . . . , ρM with 1’s, we evaluate the false acceptance rate, estimated in (24), as
FAR ≈ ˆFAR =
T
∑
d=0
Coefd[ G(z) ].
The values of ˆFAR are given in Table 4 for the DNA data. As a result, one can conclude that
the additive coding scheme can give a very efficient solution to the authentication problem
provided that there is a class of specific codes having the certain minimum distance and
corresponding decoding algorithms that require a low computational complexity.
7. Permutation block coding schemes
The permutation block coding scheme can be viewed as a modification of the scheme in
Figure 4 where the sum modulo q in the link to the attacker is replaced by a stochastic
mapping f (x,b), as it is shown in Figure 6. In this section, we will assume that q = 2. In
particular, the modification of a wiretap-type block coding scheme is possible when both
the vector x and b have equal weights and f (x,b) stands for the binary representation of
a permutation pi that transforms the vector x to the vector b. Formally, let B = {0, 1}nw, where
{0, 1}nw is the set consisting of binary vectors of the Hamming weight w. Thus, the biometric
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Fig. 6. Modified wiretap-type block coding scheme.
vector is a binary vector b of length n chosen by a combinatorial (n,w)-source, i.e.,
wt(b) = w ⇒ Pr
bio
{B = b} = 0. (27)
Let C denote a binary code consisting of M different codewords of length n and weight w, i.e.,
C ⊆ {0, 1}nw and | C | = M.
The permutation of components of some vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n
w is determined
by a vector pi ∈ P in such a way that pi(x) = (xpi1 , . . . , xpin ), where P is the set of all
possible permutations of components of the vector (1, . . . , n). Given a vector b ∈ {0, 1}nw
and a permutation pi ∈ P , let pi−1 ∈ P denote the inverse permutation, i.e., pi−1(b) =
(bi1(pi), . . . , bin(pi)), where ij(pi) ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the index determined by the equation piij(pi) =
j.
For all vectors x,b ∈ {0, 1}nw, let
P(x → b) = {pi ∈ P : pi(x) = b } (28)
denote the set of permutations that transform the vector x to the vector b. Let us introduce the
probability distribution
γx,b = ( γ(pi|x,b), pi ∈ P )
in such a way that γ(pi|x,b) can be positive only if pi ∈ P(x → b). Let us also denote a
uniform probability distribution over the set P(x → b) by
γx,b = ( γ(pi|x,b), pi ∈ P ),
where
γ(pi|x,b) =
{
| P(x,b)|−1, if pi ∈ P(x → b),
0, if pi ∈ P(x → b).
For example, let n = 4, k = 2. The set {0, 1}42 consists of (
4
2) = 6 binary vectors of length 4
having the weight 2 and P is the set consisting of 4! = 24 permutations of components of the
vector (1, 2, 3, 4). For all x,b ∈ {0, 1}42, the set P(x → b) consists of 2!2! = 4 permutations. In
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particular,
P(1100→ 1010) = { 1324, 1423, 2314, 2413 }.
Notice that
b = pi(x)
b′ = b⊕ e
}
⇒ pi−1(b′) = pi−1(b)⊕pi−1(e) = x⊕pi−1(e) (29)
and
wt(pi−1(e)) = wt(e), (30)
i.e., the decoder observes “the transmitted codeword” x as x ⊕ pi−1(e). If the source
generating the noise vectors is assumed to be a memoryless source, then (30) implies that
the presence of the permutation pi−1 does not affect the decoding strategy, and the scheme is
equivalent to the one in Figure 6.
Processing of a given biometric vector b at the enrollment stage and processing data at the
verification stage when the verifier considers only the output of the observation channel is
illustrated in Figure 7.
The enrollment stage.
– Choose a key codeword x according to a uniform probability distribution over the code C and
compute the value of Hash(x).
– Given a pair of vectors (x,b) ∈ {0, 1}nw × {0, 1}
n
w, choose a permutation pi ∈ P according to the
probability distribution γx,b.
– Store (Hash(x),pi) in the database.
The verification stage.
– Read the data (Hash(x),pi) associated with the claimed person from the database.
– Apply the inverse permutation pi−1 to the vector b′ and decode the key codeword given a received
vector pi−1(b′) as xˆ. If Hash(xˆ) = Hash(x), then accept the identity claim (Acc). If Hash(xˆ) =
Hash(x), then reject the identity claim (Rej).
One can easily see that if the code C satisfies (20), then (29), (30) guarantee that the false
rejection rate FRR and the false acceptance rate for a randomly chosen person FAR are the
same as for the additive block coding scheme. Therefore, the reasons for introducing the more
advanced permutation scheme are caused by possible decrease of the false acceptance rate for
an attacker. We will derive a general formula for the FAR and demonstrate the effects for a
specific assignment of input data.
Let
γ = ( γx,b, x,b ∈ {0, 1}
n
w )
denote the list of conditional probability distributions over the set P . In general, the attacker
applies a fixed function ψ : P → {0, 1}n to the permutation pi stored in the DB and submits
the vector b′ = ψ(pi) to the verifier. Let us assume that the verifier decodes the key codeword
as the vector xˆ[pi−1(b′)]. The probability of successful attack can be expressed as
FAR =
1
M ∑
x∈C
∑
b
ω(b) ∑
pi∈P
γ(pi|x,b)χ{ xˆ[pi−1(ψ(pi))] = x }, (31)
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Fig. 7. The data processing in a permutation block coding scheme.
and one can easily see that FAR is maximized when the attacker applies the maximum a
posteriori probability decoding, which results in
ψ(pi) = pi
(
argmax
x∈C
γbio(pi|x)
)
,
where
γbio(pi|x) = ∑
b
ω(b)γ(pi|x,b). (32)
Then
FAR =
1
M ∑
pi∈P
max
x∈C
γbio(pi|x).
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Notice that ( γbio(pi|x), pi ∈ P ) is the conditional probability distribution over the set P and
∑
pi∈P
γbio(pi|x) = 1.
Notice also that the vector x ∈ {0, 1}nw and the permutation pi ∈ P uniquely determine the
vector b0 ∈ {0, 1}nw such that pi ∈ P(x → b
0). Namely, b0 = pi(x), and the sum at the
right-hand side of (32) contains at most one non–zero term.
The attacker has two simple possibilities: 1) fix a codeword x′ ∈ C and submit the vector
b′ = pi(x′); 2) submit the most likely biometric vector. In the first case, the attacker has to
know the code C and the stored permutation pi. In the second case, he does not know these
data and equivalent to an attacker, who does not have access to the database and ignorant
about the code. One can easily see that the probabilities of successful attacks are equal to
1/M and ω∗, respectively. Therefore the probability of successful attack under the maximum
a posteriori probability decoding of the key codeword is bounded from below as follows:
FAR ≥ max
{ 1
M
, ω∗
}
.
Let n = 8, w = 4, M = 4. Let the codewords x1, . . . , x4 and the biometric vectors that can be
processed at the enrollment stage be specified as
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
x1
x2
x3
x4
⎤
⎥⎥ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
00110011
01010101
10101010
11001100
⎤
⎥⎥ ,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b1
.
.
b6
⎤
⎥⎥ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
00001111
00110011
01010101
10101010
11001100
11110000
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
,
i.e., C = { x1, x2, x3, x4} and B = { b1, . . . ,b6}. Then, for all pairs of vectors (x,b) ∈ C × B,
| P(x → b) | = (4!)2 = 576 (33)
and
| PC→B(x → b) | = 4(2!)
4 = 64, (34)
where PC→B(x → b) denotes the set of permutations pi ∈ P(x → b) such that pi(x
′) ∈ B for
all x′ ∈ C.
Let us illustrate our considerations by the following examples:
⎡
⎣ pi
′
pi
′(x1)
pi
′(x2)
⎤
 =
⎡
⎣ 1 2 5 6 3 4 7 80 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
⎤
 ,
⎡
⎣ pi
′′
pi
′′(x1)
pi
′′(x2)
⎤
 =
⎡
⎣ 1 2 6 5 3 4 7 80 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
⎤
 .
The permutations pi′ and pi′′ belong to the set P . Furthermore, pi′(x1) = pi
′′(x1) = b1.
However pi′(x2) ∈ B, while pi
′′(x2) ∈ B. Suppose that pi
′ is the permutation stored in
the database. The attacker applies this permutation to all codewords of the code C and
constructs the list pi′(x1), . . . , pi
′(x4). All entries of this list are possible biometric vectors.
If the permutation pi′′ is stored in the database, then the list pi′(x1), . . . ,pi
′(x4) contains only
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2 biometric vectors. The probability of successful attack is greater in the second case, and the
permutation pi′ can be considered as “a bad” permutation.
The most of the permutations are bad permutations (see (33), (34)). This observation leads
to the statement that the uniform probability distribution over the set P(x → b), where x
is the selected codeword and b is the biometric vector, can bring a rather poor performance.
Namely, suppose that the probability distribution over the set B is uniform, i.e., ω(b) = 1/6
for all b ∈ B. Let x be the codeword of the code C used at the enrollment stage. If γx,b = γx,b,
then the permutation is uniformly chosen from the set containing 576 entries. Only 64 of these
permutations have the property that the set pi(x), x ∈ C contains 4 biometric vectors, and the
probability of successful attack is equal to 1/4. For the other 512 permutations, the set pi(x),
x ∈ C, contains 2 biometric vectors, and the probability of successful attack is equal to 1/2.
Thus
FAR =
64
576
(1/4) +
512
576
(1/2) = 17/36.
Let us assign γx,b as a uniform probability distribution over the set PC→B(x → b) consisting
of 64 entries. In all cases, the list pi(x), x ∈ C, contains 4 biometric vectors, and the probability
of successful attack is equal to 1/4. As a result, the probability of successful attack is expressed
as
FAR =
64
64
(1/4) = 1/4,
which is approximately twice less the value obtained with the uniform probability
distribution. Moreover, we obtain that the lower bound 1/M on the probability FAR is
attained with the equality.
Let us consider a non–uniform probability distribution over the set B. Namely, let a ∈
[1/4, 1/2] be a fixed parameter and let
ω(b) =
{
a, if b ∈ {00001111, 11110000},
1/4− a/2, if b ∈ B\{00001111, 11110000}.
Notice that the set PC→B(x1 → b1) contains 32 permutations pi such that
{pi(x1),pi(x2),pi(x3),pi(x4)} = {b1,b2,b5,b6}
and 32 permutations pi such that
{pi(x1),pi(x2),pi(x3),pi(x4)} = {b1,b3,b4,b6}.
Let us denote the subsets of these permutations by P ′C→B(x1 → b1) and P
′′
C→B(x1 → b1),
respectively. Let
(a) γx1,b1 ,γx1,b6 be uniform probability distributions over the set PC→B(x1 → b1);
(b) γx1,b2 ,γx1,b5 be uniform probability distributions over the set P
′
C→B(x1 → b1);
(c) γx1,b3 ,γx1,b4 be uniform probability distributions over the set P
′′
C→B(x1 → b1).
If pi ∈ P ′C→B(x1 → b1), then the a posteriori probabilities associated with the biometric vectors
b1,b2,b5,b6 are equal to
1
32
(a/2, 1/2− a/2, 1/2− a/2, a/2).
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b˜ w˜ i b w b˜ w˜ i b w b˜ w˜ i b w b˜ w˜ i b w b˜ w˜ i b w
0000 0 2 1100 2 0001 1 1 1001 2 0010 1 1 1010 2 0100 1 1 1100 2 1000 1 3 0110 2
1111 4 2 0011 2 1110 3 1 0110 2 1101 3 1 0101 2 1011 3 1 0011 2 0111 3 3 1001 2
Table 5. Transformation of vectors of length n = 4 and weights 0,1,3,4 to balanced vectors,
where w˜,w are the Hamming weights of the vectors b˜,b and i is the length of the prefix of
the vector b˜, which has to be inverted to obtain the vector b.
However a/2 ≥ 1/2 − a/2, and the attacker outputs either the key codeword, which is
mapped to the vector b1, or the key codeword, which is mapped to the vector b6. Similar
considerations can be presented for the permutations belonging to the set P ′′C→B(x1 → b1).
As a result, we conclude that
FAR = 64(a/64) = a,
i.e., the lower bound ω∗ on the false acceptance rate is attained with the equality.
Let us consider the error–correcting capabilities of the verifier, who processes data of a
legitimate user. Let Pw denote the probability that the vector b
′ differs from the vector b
in w positions, w = 0, . . . , 8. Then, assuming that the vectors b′ are uniformly distributed over
the set of vectors located at a fixed distance from the vector b, we obtain that the probability
of correct decoding for the code C and the threshold T = 2 is equal to
1− FRR = P0 + P1 + (16/28)P2,
since the decoder makes the correct decision for all error patterns of weight at most 1 and for
16 error patterns of weight 2 (the total number of error patterns of weight 2 is equal to 28).
Suppose that the processed biometric vectors are constructed as a concatenation of L vectors
b(1), . . . ,b(L) ∈ B, i.e., the total length of the vector is equal to 8L. Suppose also that the vectors
b(1), . . . ,b(L) are independently generated according to a uniform probability distribution
over the set B. Let the verifier make the acceptance decision if and only if such a decision
is made for all L entries. Then the probability of correct decision is equal to (1− FRR)L. On
the other hand, the probability of successful attack, when the probability distributions γx,b
are used is equal to (1/4)L. This example illustrates the possibility of constructing the desired
probability distribution over the permutations only for the subblocks of input data, and the
search for good distributions is computationally feasible.
Notice that the fixed Hamming weight of the possible biometric vectors is the constraint that
has to be satisfied to implement the permutation block coding scheme. It can be done if the
observer takes into account only a fixed number of the most reliable biometric parameters.
For example, in the case of processing fingerprints, one can put an n1 × n2 grid on the
2-dimensional plane (in this case, n = n1n2) and register the w most reliableminutiae points in
the cells of that grid. In general case, the biometric binary vector of length n can be viewed as
a vector of n features where positions of 1’s index the features that are present in the outcomes
of the measurements. The total number of the most reliable features taken into account by the
authentication scheme can be fixed in advance.
Another useful possibility is known as balancing arbitrary binary vector by the inversion of its
prefix in such a way that the obtained vector has weight ⌊n/2⌋. The corresponding statement
is presented below, and the examples of the transformation are given in Table 5. One can see
that, for any binary vector b˜ ∈ {0, 1}n, one can find an index i ∈ {0, . . . , n} in such a way that
the vector b˜ is transformed to a balanced vector by the inversion of the first i components,
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i.e., (i − w˜i) + w˜ − w˜i = ⌊n/2⌋, where w˜ and w˜i denote the Hamming weight of the vector
b˜ and the Hamming weight of the prefix of length i of the vector b˜, respectively. The proof
directly follows from the observation that the path on the plane whose coordinates are defined
as (j, w˜j), j = 0, . . . , n, starts at the point (0,wt(b)), ends at the point (n, n −wt(b)), and has
increments ±1. Therefore, there is at least one index i such that w˜i = ⌊n/2⌋. Notice that the
case w = ⌊n/2⌋ can be viewed as the most interesting one meaning the characteristics of the
permutation block coding scheme. The claim above shows that an additional storage of the
value of the parameter i used to transform an arbitrary binary vector to a vector belonging to
the set {0, 1}n
⌊n/2⌋
makes the implementation of such a scheme possible in general.
The mapping of the pair (x,b) to a binary string stored in the database can be viewed as
the encryption of the message b, which is parameterized by a key codeword x ∈ C chosen
at random. An interesting point is the possibility of decreasing the probability of successful
attack, when an attacker tries to pass through the authentication stage with the acceptance
decision, by using a randomized mapping, although the values of additional random parameters
are public. In the permutation block coding scheme, a randomly chosen permutation that
transforms the vector x to the vector b is used for these purposes. As the set of possible
permutations has the cardinality, which is exponential in the length of the vectors, the designer
has good chances to hide many of biometric vectors that differ from the most likely vector b∗
into the information that can correspond to the vector b∗. Thus, one can even reach exactly the
same secrecy of the coded system as the secrecy of the blind guessing of the biometric vector,
when the attacker does not have access to the database and ignorant about the code. In other
words, one can talk about the possibility of constructing permutation block coding schemes
that have a perfect algorithmic secrecy. This notion is different from the usual definition of
perfectness, which is understood as the point that the conditional entropy of the probability
distribution over the key codewords, given the content of the database, is equal to log M.
In our example presented in the previous subsection, the a posteriori probability distribution
over the key codewords certainly depends on a particular permutation, and the conditional
entropies of these distributions can be much less than the entropy of a uniform probability
distribution. Nevertheless, an optimum attacker cannot use this fact, and his observations do
not introduce changing in the decoding algorithm.
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